



Results from the implementation of aid 






Currently there is a climate of high expectations within the international community with 
regard to producing demonstrable results of aid effectiveness in the health sector both at 
global and  developing country level. Yet, measuring the results from aid effectiveness 
presents methodological challenges. Existing evaluation frameworks are not sufficiently 
geared toward whether and how practices have changed. This paper presents a framework for 
measuring results from implementing the aid effectiveness principles at three levels: 
implementation process, system strengthening, and outcomes/impact. We developed it in the 
context of the monitoring of the results from the aid effectiveness agenda in the health sector 
in Mali. Despite some changes in behavior resulting in increased aid effectiveness and 
improved results at system and impact level, these principles have not been fully implemented 










The effectiveness of development assistance to poor countries has been a major area of 
concern for both academics and practitioners over the past two decades, and it is likely to 
remain so as budgets from traditional donors are currently under severe fiscal strain. 
Evaluations performed during the 1990’s pointed out that the relative ineffectiveness of 
development aid was partly due to factors inherent in traditional aid modalities (namely stand-
alone projects and structural adjustment programs), such as lack of coordination between 
donors, lack of coherence between donor-funded intervention and government operations, 
lack of capacity building and perverse effects over recipient administrations, and high 
transaction costs in managing aid funds.1 Hence innovative aid modalities, such as sector-
wide approaches (SWAp), have been introduced and implemented in order to respond to these 
weaknesses. In March 2005, the donor community led by the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee and partner countries signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
and committed to respecting a number of principles presumed to increase aid effectiveness, 
such as ownership, alignment, harmonization, results-orientation and mutual accountability. 
These commitments were reaffirmed in 2008 through the Accra Agenda for Action and in 
2011 through the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. 
 
Concerns for aid effectiveness are particularly high in the health sector where aid 
inefficiencies are related to a number of cumulative reasons both at global and country level. 
First, the global aid architecture in health is increasingly complex.2-5 Moreover, despite the 
dramatic increase in official development assistance for health over the past decade5,6, those 
flows are disproportionally targeted to fighting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, while 
strengthening health systems and service delivery is clearly insufficiently funded.4 Together 
with a number of political incentives, this creates a disconnection between aid flows and the 
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actual country needs in term of disease burdens.3,7-9  At country level, aid for health is very 
fragmented and aid effectiveness continues to be undermined by donor agencies’ 
administrative habits and institutional incentives favoring inefficient practices. While 
recognizing that global constraints percolate down to country level, this paper focuses on 
operational constraints encountered at country level. 
 
At country level, first attempts to improve donor coordination and aid effectiveness in the 
health sector were launched in the late 1990s in the form of program-based approaches 
(PBAs), better known at sectorial level as SWAps.10 Since then, the concept of SWAp has 
evolved and many definitions have been proposed.11 We define it as a way of working 
between a government and donors, who work together to gradually establish a comprehensive 
and coherent sector-wide policy and strategy – that is, a common approach for the entire 
sector.12 SWAps are definitely not a rigid model, but a dynamic process.13,14 Existing 
evaluations conclude that results from health SWAps are mixed: they are generally good at 
process level, but they are more difficult to be demonstrated in terms of health impacts.14,15 
For instance, a systematic review of the impact of PBA in the health sector in six countries 
undertaken by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group in 2009 showed that SWAps 
were largely successful in terms of coordination, oversight, harmonization and alignment of 
development assistance, but only modestly in terms of improved sector stewardship and 
achievement of national health objectives.16 The success of a SWAp appears to depend on a 
number of institutional factors, notably stakeholders’ commitments to tackle systemic issues 
and lead appropriate reforms so as to lift sector (and sometimes broader) constraints.13,14 
 
SWAp principles have recently been reinvigorated by the launch in 2007 of the International 
Health Partnership and related initiatives (IHP+), which has become a major instrument at 
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global and country level for implementing the aid effectiveness principles in the health sector. 
However, although major improvements in the way aid is delivered have been observed in 
recent years, significant progress is still needed to make health aid more effective.9,17 
 
There is currently a climate of high expectations with regard to producing demonstrable 
results of aid effectiveness in the health sector, both at global and at developing country level. 
Over the past few years, efforts have been made to better track health aid expenditure, and 
some attempts are made today to quantify health aid effectiveness.5,6,9,18 The Paris Declaration 
and IHP+ set forth a few objectives monitored by a limited number of process indicators 
reflecting better aid practices and better national systems, which in turn should produce better 
development results. In 2010, in consultations led by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
an operational framework was developed for the monitoring and evaluation of health system 
strengthening (HSS). It proposes the development of a single country platform for national 
monitoring and evaluation activities that can measure health system capacity as well as health 
system performance.19 That framework has now been adopted by IHP+ for measuring 
progress in HSS. 
 
Yet, we argue in this paper that the existing frameworks aimed at evaluating the results of aid 
effectiveness do not pay sufficient attention to the changes in behavior on the field, nor to 
ultimate development results. We thus propose to assess the results from the implementation 






The three-level assessment framework below was developed in the context of the follow-up 
and stocktaking of the implementation of aid effectiveness principles in Mali performed by 
the authors since 2005. When starting to document the Malian SWAp experience, we were 
struck by the fact that while a lot of progress was made in formal terms (especially the 
inscription of all donor interventions within the national health plan, the participation of all 
significant stakeholders in the joint steering bodies, and improvements in joint programming 
tools), a number of behaviors were not changing. This is especially the case for donors 
maintaining projects targeted on specific health issues and/or geographic areas and sometimes 
managed through specific procedures, and donors continuing to organize bilateral missions 
and evaluations in addition to the joint ones. 
 
That is why we decided to study more in-depth the implementation process of the initiatives 
in favor of aid effectiveness – starting from the SWAp to the Paris Declaration, budget 
support and IHP+. The successive case studies we performed rested on various methods from 
the analysis of existing documents and statistics to interviews with a wide variety of 
stakeholders belonging to the ministry of health (MoH) and other ministries, donors, and civil 
society. They also rest on participative observation as one author has been working for the 
MoH for two decades, one has worked for a donor agency in Mali from 1997 to 2008, and one 
has been technical assistant there from 2007 to 2009. 
 
Assessing the results from aid effectiveness 
The agenda for aid effectiveness is presumed to improve results at different levels (macro-, 
meso- and micro- level) through a causal relationship: (i) improved aid delivery practices at 
the international level (as monitored against the Paris principles for instance); this, in turn, is 
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expected to lead to (ii) improved health systems and policies at the national level; which is 
also supposed to (iii) improve health service delivery at the operational level; and ultimately, 
(iv) impact health outcomes (e.g. immunization rates, use of health services, etc.) and health 
status (e.g. morbidity and mortality rates). The rationale underlying the Paris Declaration and 
IHP+ is often viewed simplistically as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 comes here 
 
The monitoring mechanism of the Paris Declaration and IHP+ implementation is limited to 
process measures at the macro level, but there is growing pressure to demonstrate that there 
are also results at the other end of the process – that is, in terms of health status. Yet, 
producing development outcomes and impact takes time and necessitates intermediary 
processes and effective behavior change that also takes time and cannot be expected to 
produce results in health status overnight. Actually, the seemingly simple causal arrows in the 
figure above mask not only a number of changes in behavior and practice of considerable 
importance, but also other contextual influences (political, social, economic) that impact on 
results. The rationale underlying the Paris Declaration should thus take account of the 
complexity involved in reforms to increase aid effectiveness and rather be viewed as in Figure 
2. 
 
Figure 2 comes here 
 
There are two important points to make here. Firstly, demonstrating that results are 
attributable to particular strategies from the agenda for aid effectiveness is tricky because 
from a methodological point of view, it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of such 
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strategies from other confounding factors, including those outside the health sector – e.g. the 
considerable socio-economic influence on health status.20,21 Indeed, aid delivery systems, 
public programs and health systems are all complex, often interlinking systems that cannot be 
studied experimentally.22-24 Nevertheless comprehensive and contextualized research 
approaches can be used to gain useful insight into the impact of such strategies.25-27 
 
Secondly, effectively implementing the principles of aid effectiveness (beyond the few 
indicators of the Paris Declaration) necessarily encompasses many changes in behavior and 
practice on the part of both donors and recipient countries. If the principles are not fully 
implemented and the behaviors have not changed consequently (as was for instance the case 
in Zambia where little improvement in predictability of resources and donor alignment to 
country financial management systems were observed),28 one cannot expect the (only partial) 
reform to produce results or impact on the subsequent levels of the system. Yet, when a 
reform (such as the Paris Declaration) is introduced, one rarely evaluates whether it has been 
implemented as it was conceived, nor whether it has produced the necessary behavior 
changes. 
 
We argue in this paper that results from the agenda for aid effectiveness in the health sector 
can be measured at three levels. A first, critical step for evaluating the results from the Paris 
Declaration and other reforms such as IHP+ is to evaluate their implementation process as 
well as the direct effect it has had on changes in behavior for all stakeholders (donors, 
government, service providers, etc.). Such an evaluation allows not only verifying whether the 
agenda has been fully implemented, which is a result in itself, but also monitoring progress 
and increasing understanding of how and why outcomes can be improved. To understand how 
behaviors have changed (or not), a mixed method study design with a strong qualitative 
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component (e.g. multiple case studies) should be used. Such methods also apprehend country-
specific features and enable understanding how processes and results interact within the local 
context. 
 
A second level of evaluation is to assess how far donor support and implementation of Paris 
principles have contributed to the strengthening of the health system up to the level of service 
delivery. Indeed, there is mounting evidence showing that HSS is necessary to improve health 
outcomes, including the performance of vertical programmes.29,30 Such evaluations can be 
carried out with respect to the pillars of the health system,2 whilst bearing in mind that by 
definition these pillars interact with one another and therefore must all be tackled to improve 
results.23,31,32 For this second level, we recommend using an evaluation framework such as the 
one adopted by IHP+ mentioned above, that pays particular attention to the effects of donor 
interventions on HSS. 
 
Finally, the third level where improvement is expected and should be measured is at health 
outcome/status level. As already mentioned, it is impossible to prove that observed changes in 
health outcomes and status are directly attributable to aid management reforms. Nevertheless, 
qualitative methods can help to understand which processes, and how far positive changes in 
health outcomes and status, can be attributed to improvements in aid delivery systems and 
HSS.i This part of the results chain is also correctly handled by the operational framework 
adopted by IHP+ which provides guidance as for bith the type of information and the 
monitoring and evaluation actions that should be taken. Victora and colleagues also propose a 
national platform approach to evaluation design to large-scale programs that may be very 
useful, notably to increase the ownership of evaluation by domestic constituencies and deepen 




The rest of this paper makes a synthesis of all the work the authors performed in Mali until 
the end of 2011 in view of taking stock of the experience of putting aid effectiveness 
principles into practice in the health sector.33-37 Note however that recent political troubles in 
Mali have led many donors to suspend their aid in March 2012, which unfortunately 
jeopardizes the progress reached during the past decade. 
 
Application of the evaluation framework to the health sector in Mali 
Mali is very dependent on official development assistance that accounted for close to 10% of 
gross domestic product and 30% of public expenditure in 2010.38 The Government of Mali 
has been preoccupied by aid effectiveness since the 1990’s, especially in the health sector. 
Indeed, the latter is very fragmented, with some fifty donors supporting the national health 
program (called PRODESS) operational plan, very often through specific management and 
reporting procedures. A health SWAp was launched in 1999, supported by a pooled fund 
mechanism. It has then been consolidated over time and today, the SWAp is based on the 
following components: (i) PRODESS, its strategic companion documents and their medium-
term expenditure framework define coherent sectorial strategies and constitute the unique 
programming framework of the sector; (ii) PRODESS steering bodies constitute the sole 
sectorial coordination framework, directed by the Government and drawing heavily on the 
participation of civil society; (iii) PRODESS implementation and results monitoring is carried 
out jointly by steering bodies. The process was strengthened following the introduction of 
sector budget support in 2006, and the signing in April 2009 of the IHP+ national Compact 
that formalizes the commitment of the government of Mali and thirteen donors to jointly 




Level 1 assessment: implementation process 
When applying the “level 1” assessment of the framework proposed above to Mali, we found 
that some progress and positive changes have been observed in recent years that can be 
attributed to the agenda for aid effectiveness – starting from the SWAp to the Paris 
Declaration and IHP+ Compact – both on the donor and government side. On the donors’ 
side, nearly all significant donors (including international NGOs and even some non-OECD 
donors, but excluding global funds) are actively represented at the coordination mechanisms 
of the SWAp. Many bilateral donors are using the PRODESS procedures and accounts to 
manage their funds, including at operational level. Several donors (the Netherlands, Canada, 
Spain and previously Sweden) provide or have provided sector budget support in the health 
sector, accounting for roughly 10-12% of the PRODESS financing since 2006. Several “big” 
donors (including the European Commission and World Bank) provide global budget support 
with health conditionalities. With the signature of the IHP+ Compact, donors are encouraged 
to increase predictability of funding and announce in advance how and when funds will be 
disbursed; now several of them announce their funding for two or three years ahead. Some 
donors intervene in the sector through silent partnerships. Every year donors are invited to 
participate to the joint mission organized by the MoH in order to monitor changes in central 
structures and at field level. More effort is made, and in a more coherent way, to support 
health system strengthening, especially with respect to programming and statistics. 
 
On the government side, the MoH has strengthened its collaboration with the Ministry of 
Finance, and an annual joint audit is organized. The MoH has complemented the PRODESS 
with policy documents aimed at providing a single, coherent framework for health system 
strengthening, notably with respect to human resources development, which had been 
identified as critical for improving results. The quality of information and analyses shared at 
PRODESS steering bodies has improved in recent years. Since the elaboration of the IHP+ 
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Compact, the policy processes are more inclusive than ever. More resources are managed at 
the decentralized level, which is particularly necessary to get results in such a huge country as 
Mali. The MoH is also progressively strengthening its collaboration with the private 
sector.36,37 
 
These changes in practice and behavior have undoubtedly enabled to reach some progress in 
terms of aid effectiveness. This is especially the case with regards to MoH leadership, 
ownership and capacities; coordination, coherence and alignment of donor interventions with 
the national plan; efforts to align on domestic processes and systems or at least to harmonize 
donor interventions (e.g. joint arrangements for budget support); and trust building between 
partners enabling to solve difficulties when they arise. A virtuous circle has thus developed 
between the Paris Declaration components: for instance, alignment on the national program 
has underlined the need to strengthen MoH capacities, and concurrent support has reinforced 
its leadership and its capacity to direct the program. 
 
However, despite this progress, all donors have not fulfilled their commitments and some 
unfavorable practices continue, so that the principles of the Paris Declaration and IHP+ have 
yet to been fully implemented. A variety of examples can be provided. Donors continue to 
proliferate: about fifty donors are active in the health sector, of which only thirteen have 
signed the IHP+ Compact. A large number of projects targeting specific health problems 
and/or geographical areas are still managed in the sector. Some important donors including 
the Global Fund (despite being a member of IHP+ at global level) and USAID, continue to 
use separate management units and/or procedures. Many donors do not uphold their 
commitments to announce disbursements sufficiently in advance nor to make their 
disbursements on time, even when conditionalities are fulfilled. Nearly all donors active in the 
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sector continue to organize bilateral missions from headquarters as well as various workshops, 
very often imposing their own agenda to the government. Technical assistance is still planned 
and managed bilaterally. While yearly audits of the PRODESS are organized at national level, 
up to five donor specific audits have been conducted in 2010, putting a lot of pressure on the 
MoH’s financial department – which has been identified as a major factor impeding the 
implementation of planned activities.36,37 As a result, transaction costs (even if difficult to 
measure)39 were not perceived by interviewed stakeholders as decreasing.33 
 
Level 2 assessment: HSS 
Even if HSS is a process that also requires behavioral changes at the operational level, and 
therefore takes time, we can say that improvements in aid effectiveness have produced 
positive results at the system level that are likely to improve health outcomes. The Malian 
health system has a pyramidal structure, based on the health-care district system. A 
consensual (Delphi) analysis of the Malian health system performed in 2007 shows that it can 
count on a great deal of strengths, but faces a number of weaknesses as well, especially in 
terms of human resource management, so that health care quality is quite low.35 
 
Turning to level 2 of the framework proposed above, one observes that the MoH capacities 
have been strengthened, notably those of the Planning Unit which has been reinforced by 
additional staff, trainings and material. Consequently, governance of the health sector has 
improved a lot since the launch of the SWAp, especially with regards to coordination, 
coherence and complementarity of interventions. Decentralization, service packages, as well 
as the quality of the programming, planning and budgeting processes have also improved a 
lot, leading to a more efficient use of resources. Some progress has been initiated in human 
resource management, with the issue in 2009 of a national plan for human resources for health 
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development. As for the other pillars of the health system,2 coverage in terms of 
infrastructures significantly improved, particularly in initially disadvantaged regions; the 
availability of and access to essential medicines has improved; and the national health 
information system has been strengthened, notably thanks to support provided to the staff in 
charge of collecting statistics.36,37 
Level 3 assessment: outcomes/impact 
Finally, turning to level 3 of the evaluation framework, recent evaluations show that improved 
donor coordination and efforts to support HSS have progressively improved the population’s 
access to health services, their utilization and ultimately, health outcomes and status 
(including a reduction in regional disparities).39 Indeed, the health sector in Mali has been 
performing well over the past decade as most indicators of outputs and outcomes have 
progressed.40 According to WHO and UNICEF estimates, the maternal mortality ratio has 
evolved from 930/100,000 in 1990, to 770 in 2000, 620 in 2005 and 540 in 2010;41 and the 
under-5 mortality ratio has decreased from 255 per 1,000 in 1990 to 213 in 2000, 195 in 2005 
and 178 in 2010.42 A more recent survey also shows that the assisted delivery rate has grown 
from 40.6% in 2001 to 49.0% in 2006 and 56.6% in 2010; thanks to routine vaccination, 
immunization rates have progressed a lot (passing from 48.7% in 2001 to 68.4% in 2006 and 
73% in 2010 for measles; and from 39.6% in 2001 to 61.9% in 2006 and 72.1% in 2010 for 
DTC3); and the rate of underweight children under-five years of age have also decreased 
(from 33.2% in 2001 to 26.7% in 2006 and 18.9% in 2010).40,43 
 
As pointed, it is impossible to prove a linear, causal link between implementation of the Paris 
principles (level 1), improvements in health systems (level 2) and health outcomes (level 3). 
Nevertheless, qualitative methods enable to identify the most plausible factors at the origin of 
results. In Mali, beyond clear correlations between most outcome indicators and the increase 
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in the number of health facilities and health staff in regions, key informants interviewed 
stressed the following factors as explaining improvement in health outcomes and status These 
include the scaling-up – by the MoH with the support of partners – of high-impact strategies 
(immunization, distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets and artemisinin-based 
combination therapies) and those aiming to improve access to health services for the poor 
(some free health services, organization of referral and evacuation at the health district level, 
…), for women (reproductive health standards and procedures, free caesareans, emergency 
obstetric care, …) and for children (expanded program on immunization, integrated 
management of childhood illness, prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV)ii. Other 
factors identified as critical for health improvements were better availability of and access to 
medicines and health products, e introduction of new medicines in the framework of the 
National Malaria Control Program, and increased resources allocated to the regions with 
greater attention to reducing regional inequalities. Finally, better harmonization of donors 
yielding more effective resource management (e.g. integrated campaigns), and the 
development of the private healthcare sector, have also been identified as contributing to 
improvements.38 Many of these determining factors have been influenced by the principles of 




We argue in this paper that although existing evaluation frameworks developed in the context 
of the Paris Declaration (early-process indicators) and IHP+ (HSS) are undoubtedly useful, 
they are not sufficient to evaluate the results achieved from the implementation of aid 
effectiveness principles at country level. Indeed, they do not pay enough attention to 
understanding whether and how behaviors have changed at donor, central and operational 
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levels, and thus how reforms have actually been implemented. Yet, in reality, our case study 
of the health sector in Mali clearly shows that the commitments to aid effectiveness have only 
been partially implemented so far – thus there is a “two-speed implementation” of the aid 
effectiveness principles. And we have no reason to believe that it is very different in other 
sectors or countries facing a similar profile of aid dependence. 
 
The agenda for aid effectiveness in the health sector has generated high expectations 
(especially in the very fragmented health sector), perhaps underestimating the extent and 
complexity of the reforms required, and therefore the time needed, for its implementation. 
Thus in addition to political and other constraints at global level that cause health aid 
inefficiencies, even at country level, the aid effectiveness principles guide a long-term reform 
process. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a radical change to happen overnight On the 
contrary, monitoring more in-depth the “first level” of our evaluation framework is essential 
in order to discern the extent of the implementation of the agenda for aid effectiveness – 
including what the constraining factors are and why, what reforms have led to improvements 
and why, and the impact on population health. However, as the recent high level forum in 
Busan emphasized, today nobody can be satisfied with progress made in aid effectiveness 
alone: development results must also be demonstrated. Even if it is extremely difficult to 
prove causal links between the three levels of our evaluation framework, our case study in 
Mali shows that using qualitative methods can be useful to identify the most plausible factors 
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Figure 1 : Simple view of the rationale of the Paris Declaration and IHP+ in the health sector 
 
 




                                                            
i  Note that some global health initiatives have extrapolated the number of lives saved from their 
interventions; transposed to aid effectiveness and HSS, a similar practice would mean extrapolating 
that if for example an 80% reduction in mortality rates can be attributed to HSS, and 75% of HSS can 
be attributed to aid, then 60% of lives saved are attributable to aid; this, however, is not credible from 
a scientific point of view. 
ii Note that many of these strategies have been developed jointly with the support of donors – e.g. the 
national child survival strategy resulted from a UNICEF project in various pilot regions, and has since 
been scaled-up; the expanded programme on immunisation is also the result of collaboration between 
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